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 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
  * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
  *
  * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
  * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
  * All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
  *
  * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
  * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
  *
  * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
  * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
  * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
  *
  * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
  * 2006.
  *
  * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
  * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
  *
  * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
  * filesystem information.
  *
  * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
  * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
  */
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <asm/types.h>
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/socket.h>
 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how
 
 #include "audit.h"
 
 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
 
 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
  * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
 
 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
 
 /* number of audit rules */
 int audit_n_rules;
 
 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
 int audit_signals;
 
 struct audit_aux_data {
     struct audit_aux_data   *next;
     int         type;
 };
 
 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS  16
 
 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
     struct audit_aux_data   d;
     pid_t           target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
     kuid_t          target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
     kuid_t          target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
     unsigned int        target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
     u32         target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
     char            target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
     int         pid_count;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
     struct audit_aux_data   d;
     struct audit_cap_data   fcap;
     unsigned int        fcap_ver;
     struct audit_cap_data   old_pcap;
     struct audit_cap_data   new_pcap;
 };
 
 struct audit_tree_refs {
     struct audit_tree_refs *next;
     struct audit_chunk *c[31];
 };
 
 struct audit_nfcfgop_tab {
     enum audit_nfcfgop  op;
     const char      *s;
 };
 
 static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
     { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER,         "xt_register"          },
     { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE,          "xt_replace"           },
     { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER,       "xt_unregister"        },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER,      "nft_register_table"       },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER,    "nft_unregister_table"     },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER,      "nft_register_chain"       },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER,    "nft_unregister_chain"     },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER,       "nft_register_rule"    },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER,     "nft_unregister_rule"      },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER,        "nft_register_set"     },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER,      "nft_unregister_set"       },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER,    "nft_register_setelem"     },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER,  "nft_unregister_setelem"   },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER,        "nft_register_gen"     },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER,        "nft_register_obj"     },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER,      "nft_unregister_obj"       },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET,       "nft_reset_obj"        },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER,  "nft_register_flowtable"   },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER,    "nft_unregister_flowtable" },
     { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,         "nft_invalid"          },
 };
 
 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
 {
     unsigned n;
 
     if (unlikely(!ctx))
         return 0;
     n = ctx->major;
 
     switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
     case AUDITSC_NATIVE:
         if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
              audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
             return 1;
         if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
              audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
             return 1;
         if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
              audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
             return 1;
         return 0;
     case AUDITSC_COMPAT: /* 32bit on biarch */
         if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
              audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
             return 1;
         if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
              audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
             return 1;
         if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
              audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
             return 1;
         return 0;
     case AUDITSC_OPEN:
         return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
     case AUDITSC_OPENAT:
         return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
     case AUDITSC_SOCKETCALL:
         return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
     case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
         return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
     case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
         return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)ctx->openat2.flags);
     default:
         return 0;
     }
 }
 
 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
 {
     struct audit_names *n;
     umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
 
     if (unlikely(!ctx))
         return 0;
 
     list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
         if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
             ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
             return 1;
     }
 
     return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
  * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
  * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
  * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
  * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards.  We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
  * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
  * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
  */
 
 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     if (!ctx->prio) {
         ctx->prio = 1;
         ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
     }
 }
 
 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
 {
     struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
     int left = ctx->tree_count;
 
     if (likely(left)) {
         p->c[--left] = chunk;
         ctx->tree_count = left;
         return 1;
     }
     if (!p)
         return 0;
     p = p->next;
     if (p) {
         p->c[30] = chunk;
         ctx->trees = p;
         ctx->tree_count = 30;
         return 1;
     }
     return 0;
 }
 
 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
 
     ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
     if (!ctx->trees) {
         ctx->trees = p;
         return 0;
     }
     if (p)
         p->next = ctx->trees;
     else
         ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
     ctx->tree_count = 31;
     return 1;
 }
 
 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
               struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
 {
     struct audit_tree_refs *q;
     int n;
 
     if (!p) {
         /* we started with empty chain */
         p = ctx->first_trees;
         count = 31;
         /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
         if (!p)
             return;
     }
     n = count;
     for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
         while (n--) {
             audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
             q->c[n] = NULL;
         }
     }
     while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
         audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
         q->c[n] = NULL;
     }
     ctx->trees = p;
     ctx->tree_count = count;
 }
 
 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
 
     for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
         q = p->next;
         kfree(p);
     }
 }
 
 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
 {
     struct audit_tree_refs *p;
     int n;
 
     if (!tree)
         return 0;
     /* full ones */
     for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
         for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
             if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
                 return 1;
     }
     /* partial */
     if (p) {
         for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
             if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
                 return 1;
     }
     return 0;
 }
 
 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
                  struct audit_names *name,
                  struct audit_field *f,
                  struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     struct audit_names *n;
     int rc;
 
     if (name) {
         rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
         if (rc)
             return rc;
     }
 
     if (ctx) {
         list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
             rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
             if (rc)
                 return rc;
         }
     }
     return 0;
 }
 
 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
                  struct audit_names *name,
                  struct audit_field *f,
                  struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     struct audit_names *n;
     int rc;
 
     if (name) {
         rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
         if (rc)
             return rc;
     }
 
     if (ctx) {
         list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
             rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
             if (rc)
                 return rc;
         }
     }
     return 0;
 }
 
 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
                    const struct cred *cred,
                    struct audit_field *f,
                    struct audit_context *ctx,
                    struct audit_names *name)
 {
     switch (f->val) {
     /* process to file object comparisons */
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
         return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
         return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
         return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
         return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
         return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
         return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
         return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
         return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
         return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
     /* uid comparisons */
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
                         audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
     /* auid comparisons */
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
                         cred->euid);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
                         cred->suid);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
                         cred->fsuid);
     /* euid comparisons */
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
     /* suid comparisons */
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
         return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
     /* gid comparisons */
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
         return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
         return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
         return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
     /* egid comparisons */
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
         return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
         return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
     /* sgid comparison */
     case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
         return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
     default:
         WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define.  Report as a bug\n");
         return 0;
     }
     return 0;
 }
 
 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
  * otherwise.
  *
  * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
  * filtering a task rule at task creation time.  This and tsk == current are
  * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
  */
 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
                   struct audit_krule *rule,
                   struct audit_context *ctx,
                   struct audit_names *name,
                   enum audit_state *state,
                   bool task_creation)
 {
     const struct cred *cred;
     int i, need_sid = 1;
     u32 sid;
     unsigned int sessionid;
 
     if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
         return 0;
 
     cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
 
     for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
         struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
         struct audit_names *n;
         int result = 0;
         pid_t pid;
 
         switch (f->type) {
         case AUDIT_PID:
             pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
             result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
             break;
         case AUDIT_PPID:
             if (ctx) {
                 if (!ctx->ppid)
                     ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
                 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_EXE:
             result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
             if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
                 result = !result;
             break;
         case AUDIT_UID:
             result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
             break;
         case AUDIT_EUID:
             result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
             break;
         case AUDIT_SUID:
             result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
             break;
         case AUDIT_FSUID:
             result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
             break;
         case AUDIT_GID:
             result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
             if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
                 if (!result)
                     result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
             } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
                 if (result)
                     result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_EGID:
             result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
             if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
                 if (!result)
                     result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
             } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
                 if (result)
                     result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_SGID:
             result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
             break;
         case AUDIT_FSGID:
             result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
             break;
         case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
             sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
             result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
             break;
         case AUDIT_PERS:
             result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
             break;
         case AUDIT_ARCH:
             if (ctx)
                 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
             break;
 
         case AUDIT_EXIT:
             if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
                 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
             break;
         case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
             if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) {
                 if (f->val)
                     result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
                 else
                     result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
             if (name) {
                 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
                     audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
                     ++result;
             } else if (ctx) {
                 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
                     if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
                         audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
                         ++result;
                         break;
                     }
                 }
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
             if (name) {
                 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
                     audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
                     ++result;
             } else if (ctx) {
                 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
                     if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
                         audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
                         ++result;
                         break;
                     }
                 }
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_INODE:
             if (name)
                 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
             else if (ctx) {
                 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
                     if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
                         ++result;
                         break;
                     }
                 }
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
             if (name) {
                 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
             } else if (ctx) {
                 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
                     if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
                         ++result;
                         break;
                     }
                 }
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
             if (name) {
                 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
             } else if (ctx) {
                 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
                     if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
                         ++result;
                         break;
                     }
                 }
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_WATCH:
             if (name) {
                 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
                                  name->ino,
                                  name->dev);
                 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
                     result = !result;
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_DIR:
             if (ctx) {
                 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
                 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
                     result = !result;
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
             result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
                               f->op, f->uid);
             break;
         case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
             result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
             break;
         case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
             if (ctx && ctx->sockaddr)
                 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
                               f->op, f->val);
             break;
         case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
         case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
         case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
         case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
         case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
             /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
                a temporary error.  We simply treat this as a
                match for now to avoid losing information that
                may be wanted.   An error message will also be
                logged upon error */
             if (f->lsm_rule) {
                 if (need_sid) {
                     /* @tsk should always be equal to
                      * @current with the exception of
                      * fork()/copy_process() in which case
                      * the new @tsk creds are still a dup
                      * of @current's creds so we can still
                      * use security_current_getsecid_subj()
                      * here even though it always refs
                      * @current's creds
                      */
                     security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
                     need_sid = 0;
                 }
                 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
                                    f->op,
                                    f->lsm_rule);
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
         case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
         case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
         case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
         case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
             /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
                also applies here */
             if (f->lsm_rule) {
                 /* Find files that match */
                 if (name) {
                     result = security_audit_rule_match(
                                 name->osid,
                                 f->type,
                                 f->op,
                                 f->lsm_rule);
                 } else if (ctx) {
                     list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
                         if (security_audit_rule_match(
                                 n->osid,
                                 f->type,
                                 f->op,
                                 f->lsm_rule)) {
                             ++result;
                             break;
                         }
                     }
                 }
                 /* Find ipc objects that match */
                 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
                     break;
                 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
                                   f->type, f->op,
                                   f->lsm_rule))
                     ++result;
             }
             break;
         case AUDIT_ARG0:
         case AUDIT_ARG1:
         case AUDIT_ARG2:
         case AUDIT_ARG3:
             if (ctx)
                 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
             break;
         case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
             /* ignore this field for filtering */
             result = 1;
             break;
         case AUDIT_PERM:
             result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
             if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
                 result = !result;
             break;
         case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
             result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
             if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
                 result = !result;
             break;
         case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
             result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
             break;
         }
         if (!result)
             return 0;
     }
 
     if (ctx) {
         if (rule->filterkey) {
             kfree(ctx->filterkey);
             ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
         }
         ctx->prio = rule->prio;
     }
     switch (rule->action) {
     case AUDIT_NEVER:
         *state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED;
         break;
     case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
         *state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
         break;
     }
     return 1;
 }
 
 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
  * completely disabled for this task.  Since we only have the task
  * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
  */
 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
 {
     struct audit_entry *e;
     enum audit_state   state;
 
     rcu_read_lock();
     list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
         if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
                        &state, true)) {
             if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
                 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
             rcu_read_unlock();
             return state;
         }
     }
     rcu_read_unlock();
     return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
 }
 
 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
 {
     int word, bit;
 
     if (val > 0xffffffff)
         return false;
 
     word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
     if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
         return false;
 
     bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
 
     return rule->mask[word] & bit;
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_filter_uring - apply filters to an io_uring operation
  * @tsk: associated task
  * @ctx: audit context
  */
 static void audit_filter_uring(struct task_struct *tsk,
                    struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     struct audit_entry *e;
     enum audit_state state;
 
     if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
         return;
 
     rcu_read_lock();
     list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT],
                 list) {
         if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->uring_op) &&
             audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, &state,
                        false)) {
             rcu_read_unlock();
             ctx->current_state = state;
             return;
         }
     }
     rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
  * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
  * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
  * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
  */
 static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
                  struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     struct audit_entry *e;
     enum audit_state state;
 
     if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
         return;
 
     rcu_read_lock();
     list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT], list) {
         if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
             audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
                        &state, false)) {
             rcu_read_unlock();
             ctx->current_state = state;
             return;
         }
     }
     rcu_read_unlock();
     return;
 }
 
 /*
  * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
  * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
  */
 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
                    struct audit_names *n,
                    struct audit_context *ctx) {
     int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
     struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
     struct audit_entry *e;
     enum audit_state state;
 
     list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
         if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
             audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
             ctx->current_state = state;
             return 1;
         }
     }
     return 0;
 }
 
 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
  * collected during syscall processing.  We only check rules in sublists at hash
  * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
  * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
  */
 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     struct audit_names *n;
 
     if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
         return;
 
     rcu_read_lock();
 
     list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
         if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
             break;
     }
     rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
 {
     kfree(context->proctitle.value);
     context->proctitle.value = NULL;
     context->proctitle.len = 0;
 }
 
 static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
 {
     if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
         kfree(context->module.name);
         context->module.name = NULL;
     }
 }
 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 {
     struct audit_names *n, *next;
 
     list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
         list_del(&n->list);
         if (n->name)
             putname(n->name);
         if (n->should_free)
             kfree(n);
     }
     context->name_count = 0;
     path_put(&context->pwd);
     context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
     context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
 }
 
 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
 {
     struct audit_aux_data *aux;
 
     while ((aux = context->aux)) {
         context->aux = aux->next;
         kfree(aux);
     }
     context->aux = NULL;
     while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
         context->aux_pids = aux->next;
         kfree(aux);
     }
     context->aux_pids = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_reset_context - reset a audit_context structure
  * @ctx: the audit_context to reset
  *
  * All fields in the audit_context will be reset to an initial state, all
  * references held by fields will be dropped, and private memory will be
  * released.  When this function returns the audit_context will be suitable
  * for reuse, so long as the passed context is not NULL or a dummy context.
  */
 static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     if (!ctx)
         return;
 
     /* if ctx is non-null, reset the "ctx->state" regardless */
     ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED;
     if (ctx->dummy)
         return;
 
     /*
      * NOTE: It shouldn't matter in what order we release the fields, so
      *       release them in the order in which they appear in the struct;
      *       this gives us some hope of quickly making sure we are
      *       resetting the audit_context properly.
      *
      *       Other things worth mentioning:
      *       - we don't reset "dummy"
      *       - we don't reset "state", we do reset "current_state"
      *       - we preserve "filterkey" if "state" is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
      *       - much of this is likely overkill, but play it safe for now
      *       - we really need to work on improving the audit_context struct
      */
 
     ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
     ctx->serial = 0;
     ctx->major = 0;
     ctx->uring_op = 0;
     ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
     memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
     ctx->return_code = 0;
     ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
     ctx->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
     audit_free_names(ctx);
     if (ctx->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) {
         kfree(ctx->filterkey);
         ctx->filterkey = NULL;
     }
     audit_free_aux(ctx);
     kfree(ctx->sockaddr);
     ctx->sockaddr = NULL;
     ctx->sockaddr_len = 0;
     ctx->pid = ctx->ppid = 0;
     ctx->uid = ctx->euid = ctx->suid = ctx->fsuid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
     ctx->gid = ctx->egid = ctx->sgid = ctx->fsgid = KGIDT_INIT(0);
     ctx->personality = 0;
     ctx->arch = 0;
     ctx->target_pid = 0;
     ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
     ctx->target_sessionid = 0;
     ctx->target_sid = 0;
     ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0';
     unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0);
     WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees));
     audit_free_module(ctx);
     ctx->fds[0] = -1;
     audit_proctitle_free(ctx);
     ctx->type = 0; /* reset last for audit_free_*() */
 }
 
 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
 {
     struct audit_context *context;
 
     context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
     if (!context)
         return NULL;
     context->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED;
     context->state = state;
     context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
     context->fds[0] = -1;
     context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
     return context;
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
  * @tsk: task
  *
  * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
  * if necessary.  Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
  * specified task.  This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
  * needed.
  */
 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
     struct audit_context *context;
     enum audit_state     state;
     char *key = NULL;
 
     if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
         return 0;
 
     state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
     if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) {
         clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
         return 0;
     }
 
     if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
         kfree(key);
         audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
         return -ENOMEM;
     }
     context->filterkey = key;
 
     audit_set_context(tsk, context);
     set_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
     return 0;
 }
 
 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 {
     /* resetting is extra work, but it is likely just noise */
     audit_reset_context(context);
     free_tree_refs(context);
     kfree(context->filterkey);
     kfree(context);
 }
 
 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
                  kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
                  u32 sid, char *comm)
 {
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
     char *ctx = NULL;
     u32 len;
     int rc = 0;
 
     ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
     if (!ab)
         return rc;
 
     audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
     if (sid) {
         if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
             audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
             rc = 1;
         } else {
             audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
             security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
         }
     }
     audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
     audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
     audit_log_end(ab);
 
     return rc;
 }
 
 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
                   struct audit_buffer **ab)
 {
     long len_max;
     long len_rem;
     long len_full;
     long len_buf;
     long len_abuf = 0;
     long len_tmp;
     bool require_data;
     bool encode;
     unsigned int iter;
     unsigned int arg;
     char *buf_head;
     char *buf;
     const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
 
     /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
      *       data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
      *       code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
     char abuf[96];
 
     /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
      *       current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
      *       is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
      *       room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
     WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
     len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
 
     /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
     buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
     if (!buf_head) {
         audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
         return;
     }
     buf = buf_head;
 
     audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
 
     len_rem = len_max;
     len_buf = 0;
     len_full = 0;
     require_data = true;
     encode = false;
     iter = 0;
     arg = 0;
     do {
         /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
          *       serious, but the audit record format insists we
          *       provide an argument length for really long arguments,
          *       e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
          *       to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
          *       recording in the log, although we don't use it
          *       anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
         if (len_full == 0)
             len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
 
         /* read more data from userspace */
         if (require_data) {
             /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
             if (buf != buf_head) {
                 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
                 buf = buf_head;
             }
 
             /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
             len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
                             len_max - len_buf);
             if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
                 /* unable to copy from userspace */
                 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
                 goto out;
             } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
                 /* buffer is not large enough */
                 require_data = true;
                 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
                  *       buffers force the encoding so we stand
                  *       a chance at a sane len_full value and
                  *       consistent record encoding */
                 encode = true;
                 len_full = len_full * 2;
                 p += len_tmp;
             } else {
                 require_data = false;
                 if (!encode)
                     encode = audit_string_contains_control(
                                 buf, len_tmp);
                 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
                 if (len_full < len_max)
                     len_full = (encode ?
                             len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
                 p += len_tmp + 1;
             }
             len_buf += len_tmp;
             buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
 
             /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
             len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
         }
 
         /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
         if (len_buf >= 0) {
             /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
              *       can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
              *       existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
              *       a new buffer */
             if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
                 len_rem = len_max;
                 audit_log_end(*ab);
                 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
                               GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
                 if (!*ab)
                     goto out;
             }
 
             /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
             len_tmp = 0;
             if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
                 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
                 if (iter == 0) {
                     len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
                             sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
                             " a%d_len=%lu",
                             arg, len_full);
                 }
                 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
                             sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
                             " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
             } else
                 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
                             sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
                             " a%d=", arg);
             WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
             abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
 
             /* log the arg in the audit record */
             audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
             len_rem -= len_tmp;
             len_tmp = len_buf;
             if (encode) {
                 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
                     len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
                 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
                 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
                 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
             } else {
                 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
                     len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
                 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
                 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
                 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
                  * to add quotes to the remaining string */
                 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
             }
             len_buf -= len_tmp;
             buf += len_tmp;
         }
 
         /* ready to move to the next argument? */
         if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
             arg++;
             iter = 0;
             len_full = 0;
             require_data = true;
             encode = false;
         }
     } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
 
     /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
 
 out:
     kfree(buf_head);
 }
 
 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
               kernel_cap_t *cap)
 {
     int i;
 
     if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
         audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
         return;
     }
     audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
     CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
         audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
 }
 
 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
 {
     if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
         audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
         return;
     }
     audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
     audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
     audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
              name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
 }
 
 static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab)
 {
     const struct audit_ntp_data *ntp = &context->time.ntp_data;
     const struct timespec64 *tk = &context->time.tk_injoffset;
     static const char * const ntp_name[] = {
         "offset",
         "freq",
         "status",
         "tai",
         "tick",
         "adjust",
     };
     int type;
 
     if (context->type == AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL) {
         for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) {
             if (ntp->vals[type].newval != ntp->vals[type].oldval) {
                 if (!*ab) {
                     *ab = audit_log_start(context,
                             GFP_KERNEL,
                             AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL);
                     if (!*ab)
                         return;
                 }
                 audit_log_format(*ab, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli",
                          ntp_name[type],
                          ntp->vals[type].oldval,
                          ntp->vals[type].newval);
                 audit_log_end(*ab);
                 *ab = NULL;
             }
         }
     }
     if (tk->tv_sec != 0 || tk->tv_nsec != 0) {
         if (!*ab) {
             *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
                           AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET);
             if (!*ab)
                 return;
         }
         audit_log_format(*ab, "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
                  (long long)tk->tv_sec, tk->tv_nsec);
         audit_log_end(*ab);
         *ab = NULL;
     }
 }
 
 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 {
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
     int i;
 
     ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
     if (!ab)
         return;
 
     switch (context->type) {
     case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
         int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
 
         audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
         for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
             audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
                 context->socketcall.args[i]);
         break; }
     case AUDIT_IPC: {
         u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
 
         audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
                  from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
                  from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
                  context->ipc.mode);
         if (osid) {
             char *ctx = NULL;
             u32 len;
 
             if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
                 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
                 *call_panic = 1;
             } else {
                 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
                 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
             }
         }
         if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
             audit_log_end(ab);
             ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
                          AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
             if (unlikely(!ab))
                 return;
             audit_log_format(ab,
                 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
                 context->ipc.qbytes,
                 context->ipc.perm_uid,
                 context->ipc.perm_gid,
                 context->ipc.perm_mode);
         }
         break; }
     case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
         audit_log_format(ab,
             "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
             "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
             context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
             context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
             context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
             context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
             context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
         break;
     case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
         audit_log_format(ab,
             "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
             "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
             context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
             context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
             context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
             (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
             context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
         break;
     case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
         audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
                 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
                 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
         break;
     case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
         struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
 
         audit_log_format(ab,
             "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
             "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
             context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
             attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
             attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
         break; }
     case AUDIT_CAPSET:
         audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
         audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
         audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
         audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
         audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
         break;
     case AUDIT_MMAP:
         audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
                  context->mmap.flags);
         break;
     case AUDIT_OPENAT2:
         audit_log_format(ab, "oflag=0%llo mode=0%llo resolve=0x%llx",
                  context->openat2.flags,
                  context->openat2.mode,
                  context->openat2.resolve);
         break;
     case AUDIT_EXECVE:
         audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
         break;
     case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
         audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
         if (context->module.name) {
             audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
         } else
             audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
 
         break;
     case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL:
     case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET:
         /* this call deviates from the rest, eating the buffer */
         audit_log_time(context, &ab);
         break;
     }
     audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
 {
     char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
 
     while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
         end--;
 
     /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
     len = end - proctitle + 1;
     len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
     return len;
 }
 
 /*
  * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
  * @context: audit_context for the task
  * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
  * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
  * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
  * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
  */
 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
             const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
 {
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
     ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
     if (!ab)
         return;
 
     audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
 
     if (path)
         audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
     else if (n->name) {
         switch (n->name_len) {
         case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
             /* log the full path */
             audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
             audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
             break;
         case 0:
             /* name was specified as a relative path and the
              * directory component is the cwd
              */
             if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt)
                 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
             else
                 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
             break;
         default:
             /* log the name's directory component */
             audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
             audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
                             n->name_len);
         }
     } else
         audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
 
     if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
         audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
                  n->ino,
                  MAJOR(n->dev),
                  MINOR(n->dev),
                  n->mode,
                  from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
                  from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
                  MAJOR(n->rdev),
                  MINOR(n->rdev));
     if (n->osid != 0) {
         char *ctx = NULL;
         u32 len;
 
         if (security_secid_to_secctx(
             n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
             audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
             if (call_panic)
                 *call_panic = 2;
         } else {
             audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
             security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
         }
     }
 
     /* log the audit_names record type */
     switch (n->type) {
     case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
         audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
         break;
     case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
         audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
         break;
     case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
         audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
         break;
     case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
         audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
         break;
     default:
         audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
         break;
     }
 
     audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
     audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
 static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
 {
     int res;
     char *buf;
     char *msg = "(null)";
     int len = strlen(msg);
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
     ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
     if (!ab)
         return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
 
     audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
 
     /* Not  cached */
     if (!context->proctitle.value) {
         buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (!buf)
             goto out;
         /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
         res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
         if (res == 0) {
             kfree(buf);
             goto out;
         }
         res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
         if (res == 0) {
             kfree(buf);
             goto out;
         }
         context->proctitle.value = buf;
         context->proctitle.len = res;
     }
     msg = context->proctitle.value;
     len = context->proctitle.len;
 out:
     audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
     audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_log_uring - generate a AUDIT_URINGOP record
  * @ctx: the audit context
  */
 static void audit_log_uring(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
     const struct cred *cred;
 
     ab = audit_log_start(ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_URINGOP);
     if (!ab)
         return;
     cred = current_cred();
     audit_log_format(ab, "uring_op=%d", ctx->uring_op);
     if (ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
         audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
                  (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS ?
                   "yes" : "no"),
                  ctx->return_code);
     audit_log_format(ab,
              " items=%d"
              " ppid=%d pid=%d uid=%u gid=%u euid=%u suid=%u"
              " fsuid=%u egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
              ctx->name_count,
              task_ppid_nr(current), task_tgid_nr(current),
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
              from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
              from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
              from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
              from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
     audit_log_task_context(ab);
     audit_log_key(ab, ctx->filterkey);
     audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
 static void audit_log_exit(void)
 {
     int i, call_panic = 0;
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
     struct audit_aux_data *aux;
     struct audit_names *n;
 
     context->personality = current->personality;
 
     switch (context->context) {
     case AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL:
         ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
         if (!ab)
             return;
         audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
                  context->arch, context->major);
         if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
             audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
         if (context->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
             audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
                      (context->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS ?
                       "yes" : "no"),
                      context->return_code);
         audit_log_format(ab,
                  " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
                  context->argv[0],
                  context->argv[1],
                  context->argv[2],
                  context->argv[3],
                  context->name_count);
         audit_log_task_info(ab);
         audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
         audit_log_end(ab);
         break;
     case AUDIT_CTX_URING:
         audit_log_uring(context);
         break;
     default:
         BUG();
         break;
     }
 
     for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
 
         ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
         if (!ab)
             continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
         switch (aux->type) {
 
         case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
             struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
 
             audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
             audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
             audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
             audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
                      from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
                            axs->fcap.rootid));
             break; }
 
         }
         audit_log_end(ab);
     }
 
     if (context->type)
         show_special(context, &call_panic);
 
     if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
         ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
         if (ab) {
             audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
                     context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
             audit_log_end(ab);
         }
     }
 
     if (context->sockaddr_len) {
         ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
         if (ab) {
             audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
             audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
                     context->sockaddr_len);
             audit_log_end(ab);
         }
     }
 
     for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
         struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
 
         for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
             if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
                           axs->target_auid[i],
                           axs->target_uid[i],
                           axs->target_sessionid[i],
                           axs->target_sid[i],
                           axs->target_comm[i]))
                 call_panic = 1;
     }
 
     if (context->target_pid &&
         audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
                   context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
                   context->target_sessionid,
                   context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
             call_panic = 1;
 
     if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
         ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
         if (ab) {
             audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
             audit_log_end(ab);
         }
     }
 
     i = 0;
     list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
         if (n->hidden)
             continue;
         audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
     }
 
     if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
         audit_log_proctitle();
 
     /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
     ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
     if (ab)
         audit_log_end(ab);
     if (call_panic)
         audit_panic("error in audit_log_exit()");
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
  * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
  *
  * Called from copy_process, do_exit, and the io_uring code
  */
 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
 
     if (!context)
         return;
 
     /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
     if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
         audit_kill_trees(context);
 
     /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
      * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
      * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
      * need to log via audit_log_exit().
      */
     if (tsk == current && !context->dummy) {
         context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
         context->return_code = 0;
         if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) {
             audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
             audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
             if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
                 audit_log_exit();
         } else if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_URING) {
             /* TODO: verify this case is real and valid */
             audit_filter_uring(tsk, context);
             audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
             if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
                 audit_log_uring(context);
         }
     }
 
     audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
     audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_return_fixup - fixup the return codes in the audit_context
  * @ctx: the audit_context
  * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not
  * @code: operation return code
  *
  * We need to fixup the return code in the audit logs if the actual return
  * codes are later going to be fixed by the arch specific signal handlers.
  */
 static void audit_return_fixup(struct audit_context *ctx,
                    int success, long code)
 {
     /*
      * This is actually a test for:
      * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
      * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
      *
      * but is faster than a bunch of ||
      */
     if (unlikely(code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
         (code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
         (code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
         ctx->return_code = -EINTR;
     else
         ctx->return_code  = code;
     ctx->return_valid = (success ? AUDITSC_SUCCESS : AUDITSC_FAILURE);
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_uring_entry - prepare the kernel task's audit context for io_uring
  * @op: the io_uring opcode
  *
  * This is similar to audit_syscall_entry() but is intended for use by io_uring
  * operations.  This function should only ever be called from
  * audit_uring_entry() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
  * function.
  */
 void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
 {
     struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
 
     if (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
         return;
 
     /*
      * NOTE: It's possible that we can be called from the process' context
      *       before it returns to userspace, and before audit_syscall_exit()
      *       is called.  In this case there is not much to do, just record
      *       the io_uring details and return.
      */
     ctx->uring_op = op;
     if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
         return;
 
     ctx->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
     if (!ctx->dummy && ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD)
         ctx->prio = 0;
 
     ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
     ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
     ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_uring_exit - wrap up the kernel task's audit context after io_uring
  * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not
  * @code: operation return code
  *
  * This is similar to audit_syscall_exit() but is intended for use by io_uring
  * operations.  This function should only ever be called from
  * audit_uring_exit() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
  * function.
  */
 void __audit_uring_exit(int success, long code)
 {
     struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
 
     if (ctx->dummy) {
         if (ctx->context != AUDIT_CTX_URING)
             return;
         goto out;
     }
 
     audit_return_fixup(ctx, success, code);
     if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) {
         /*
          * NOTE: See the note in __audit_uring_entry() about the case
          *       where we may be called from process context before we
          *       return to userspace via audit_syscall_exit().  In this
          *       case we simply emit a URINGOP record and bail, the
          *       normal syscall exit handling will take care of
          *       everything else.
          *       It is also worth mentioning that when we are called,
          *       the current process creds may differ from the creds
          *       used during the normal syscall processing; keep that
          *       in mind if/when we move the record generation code.
          */
 
         /*
          * We need to filter on the syscall info here to decide if we
          * should emit a URINGOP record.  I know it seems odd but this
          * solves the problem where users have a filter to block *all*
          * syscall records in the "exit" filter; we want to preserve
          * the behavior here.
          */
         audit_filter_syscall(current, ctx);
         if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
             audit_filter_uring(current, ctx);
         audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
         if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
             return;
 
         audit_log_uring(ctx);
         return;
     }
 
     /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
     if (!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees))
         audit_kill_trees(ctx);
 
     /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */
     audit_filter_uring(current, ctx);
     audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
     if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
         goto out;
     audit_log_exit();
 
 out:
     audit_reset_context(ctx);
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
  * @major: major syscall type (function)
  * @a1: additional syscall register 1
  * @a2: additional syscall register 2
  * @a3: additional syscall register 3
  * @a4: additional syscall register 4
  *
  * Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
  * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
  * filters demand the audit context be built.  If the state from the
  * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
  * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
  * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
  * be written).
  */
 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
                unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     enum audit_state     state;
 
     if (!audit_enabled || !context)
         return;
 
     WARN_ON(context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED);
     WARN_ON(context->name_count);
     if (context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED || context->name_count) {
         audit_panic("unrecoverable error in audit_syscall_entry()");
         return;
     }
 
     state = context->state;
     if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
         return;
 
     context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
     if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) {
         context->prio = 0;
         if (auditd_test_task(current))
             return;
     }
 
     context->arch       = syscall_get_arch(current);
     context->major      = major;
     context->argv[0]    = a1;
     context->argv[1]    = a2;
     context->argv[2]    = a3;
     context->argv[3]    = a4;
     context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
     context->current_state  = state;
     ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
  * @success: success value of the syscall
  * @return_code: return value of the syscall
  *
  * Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
  * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
  * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
  * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
  * free the names stored from getname().
  */
 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     if (!context || context->dummy ||
         context->context != AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
         goto out;
 
     /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
     if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
         audit_kill_trees(context);
 
     audit_return_fixup(context, success, return_code);
     /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */
     audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
     audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
     if (context->current_state < AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
         goto out;
 
     audit_log_exit();
 
 out:
     audit_reset_context(context);
 }
 
 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
 {
     struct audit_context *context;
     struct audit_tree_refs *p;
     struct audit_chunk *chunk;
     int count;
 
     if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
         return;
     context = audit_context();
     p = context->trees;
     count = context->tree_count;
     rcu_read_lock();
     chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
     rcu_read_unlock();
     if (!chunk)
         return;
     if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
         return;
     if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
         pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
         audit_set_auditable(context);
         audit_put_chunk(chunk);
         unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
         return;
     }
     put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
 }
 
 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
     struct audit_context *context;
     struct audit_tree_refs *p;
     const struct dentry *d, *parent;
     struct audit_chunk *drop;
     unsigned long seq;
     int count;
 
     context = audit_context();
     p = context->trees;
     count = context->tree_count;
 retry:
     drop = NULL;
     d = dentry;
     rcu_read_lock();
     seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
     for(;;) {
         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
 
         if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
             struct audit_chunk *chunk;
 
             chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
             if (chunk) {
                 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
                     drop = chunk;
                     break;
                 }
             }
         }
         parent = d->d_parent;
         if (parent == d)
             break;
         d = parent;
     }
     if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) {  /* in this order */
         rcu_read_unlock();
         if (!drop) {
             /* just a race with rename */
             unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
             goto retry;
         }
         audit_put_chunk(drop);
         if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
             /* OK, got more space */
             unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
             goto retry;
         }
         /* too bad */
         pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
         unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
         audit_set_auditable(context);
         return;
     }
     rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
                         unsigned char type)
 {
     struct audit_names *aname;
 
     if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
         aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
         memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
     } else {
         aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
         if (!aname)
             return NULL;
         aname->should_free = true;
     }
 
     aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
     aname->type = type;
     list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
 
     context->name_count++;
     if (!context->pwd.dentry)
         get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
     return aname;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
  * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
  *
  * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
  * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
  * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
  */
 struct filename *
 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     struct audit_names *n;
 
     list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
         if (!n->name)
             continue;
         if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
             n->name->refcnt++;
             return n->name;
         }
     }
     return NULL;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
  * @name: name to add
  *
  * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
  * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
  */
 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     struct audit_names *n;
 
     if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
         return;
 
     n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
     if (!n)
         return;
 
     n->name = name;
     n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
     name->aname = n;
     name->refcnt++;
 }
 
 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
                    const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
     struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
     int rc;
 
     if (!dentry)
         return 0;
 
     rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, dentry, &caps);
     if (rc)
         return rc;
 
     name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
     name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
     name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
     name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
     name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
                 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
 
     return 0;
 }
 
 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
                  const struct dentry *dentry,
                  struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
 {
     name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
     name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
     name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
     name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
     name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
     name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
     security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
     if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
         name->fcap_ver = -1;
         return;
     }
     audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
  * @name: name being audited
  * @dentry: dentry being audited
  * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
  */
 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
            unsigned int flags)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
     struct audit_names *n;
     bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
     struct audit_entry *e;
     struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
     int i;
 
     if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
         return;
 
     rcu_read_lock();
     list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
         for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
             struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
 
             if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
                 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
                         f->op, f->val)
                 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
                 rcu_read_unlock();
                 return;
             }
         }
     }
     rcu_read_unlock();
 
     if (!name)
         goto out_alloc;
 
     /*
      * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
      * just use it directly if the type is correct.
      */
     n = name->aname;
     if (n) {
         if (parent) {
             if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
                 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
                 goto out;
         } else {
             if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
                 goto out;
         }
     }
 
     list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
         if (n->ino) {
             /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
             if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
                 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
                 continue;
         } else if (n->name) {
             /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
             if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
                 continue;
         } else
             /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
             continue;
 
         /* match the correct record type */
         if (parent) {
             if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
                 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
                 goto out;
         } else {
             if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
                 goto out;
         }
     }
 
 out_alloc:
     /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
     n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
     if (!n)
         return;
     if (name) {
         n->name = name;
         name->refcnt++;
     }
 
 out:
     if (parent) {
         n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
         n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
         if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
             n->hidden = true;
     } else {
         n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
         n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
     }
     handle_path(dentry);
     audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
 }
 
 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
 {
     __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
  * @parent: inode of dentry parent
  * @dentry: dentry being audited
  * @type:   AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
  *
  * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
  * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
  * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
  * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
  * the object is created.  Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
  * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
  * unsuccessful attempts.
  */
 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
              const struct dentry *dentry,
              const unsigned char type)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
     const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
     struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
     struct audit_entry *e;
     struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
     int i;
 
     if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
         return;
 
     rcu_read_lock();
     list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
         for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
             struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
 
             if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
                 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
                         f->op, f->val)
                 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
                 rcu_read_unlock();
                 return;
             }
         }
     }
     rcu_read_unlock();
 
     if (inode)
         handle_one(inode);
 
     /* look for a parent entry first */
     list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
         if (!n->name ||
             (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
              n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
             continue;
 
         if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
             !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
                           n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
             if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
                 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
             found_parent = n;
             break;
         }
     }
 
     /* is there a matching child entry? */
     list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
         /* can only match entries that have a name */
         if (!n->name ||
             (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
             continue;
 
         if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
             !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
                         found_parent ?
                         found_parent->name_len :
                         AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
             if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
                 n->type = type;
             found_child = n;
             break;
         }
     }
 
     if (!found_parent) {
         /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
         n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
         if (!n)
             return;
         audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
     }
 
     if (!found_child) {
         found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
         if (!found_child)
             return;
 
         /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
          * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
          * audit_free_names() */
         if (found_parent) {
             found_child->name = found_parent->name;
             found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
             found_child->name->refcnt++;
         }
     }
 
     if (inode)
         audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
     else
         found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
 
 /**
  * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
  * @ctx: audit_context for the task
  * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
  * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
  *
  * Also sets the context as auditable.
  */
 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
                struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
 {
     if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
         return 0;
     if (!ctx->serial)
         ctx->serial = audit_serial();
     t->tv_sec  = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
     t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
     *serial    = ctx->serial;
     if (!ctx->prio) {
         ctx->prio = 1;
         ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
     }
     return 1;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
  * @oflag: open flag
  * @mode: mode bits
  * @attr: queue attributes
  *
  */
 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     if (attr)
         memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
     else
         memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
 
     context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
     context->mq_open.mode = mode;
 
     context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
  * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
  * @msg_len: Message length
  * @msg_prio: Message priority
  * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
  *
  */
 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
             const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
 
     if (abs_timeout)
         memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
     else
         memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
 
     context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
     context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
     context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
 
     context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
  * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
  * @notification: Notification event
  *
  */
 
 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     if (notification)
         context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
     else
         context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
 
     context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
     context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
  * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
  * @mqstat: MQ flags
  *
  */
 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
     context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
     context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
  * @ipcp: ipc permissions
  *
  */
 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
     context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
     context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
     context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
     security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
     context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
  * @qbytes: msgq bytes
  * @uid: msgq user id
  * @gid: msgq group id
  * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
  *
  * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
  */
 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
     context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
     context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
     context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
     context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
 }
 
 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
     context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
 }
 
 
 /**
  * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
  * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
  * @args: args array
  *
  */
 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
         return -EINVAL;
     context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
     context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
     memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
     return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
  * @fd1: the first file descriptor
  * @fd2: the second file descriptor
  *
  */
 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->fds[0] = fd1;
     context->fds[1] = fd2;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
  * @len: data length in user space
  * @a: data address in kernel space
  *
  * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
  */
 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     if (!context->sockaddr) {
         void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
 
         if (!p)
             return -ENOMEM;
         context->sockaddr = p;
     }
 
     context->sockaddr_len = len;
     memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
     return 0;
 }
 
 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
     context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
     context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
     context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
     security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
     memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
  * @t: task being signaled
  *
  * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
  * and uid that is doing that.
  */
 int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 {
     struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
     struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
     kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
 
     if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
         return 0;
 
     /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
      * in audit_context */
     if (!ctx->target_pid) {
         ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
         ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
         ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
         ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
         security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
         memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
         return 0;
     }
 
     axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
     if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
         axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
         if (!axp)
             return -ENOMEM;
 
         axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
         axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
         ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
     }
     BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
 
     axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
     axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
     axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
     axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
     security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
     memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
     axp->pid_count++;
 
     return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
  * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
  * @new: the proposed new credentials
  * @old: the old credentials
  *
  * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
  * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
  *
  * -Eric
  */
 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
                const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
     struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
 
     ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
     if (!ax)
         return -ENOMEM;
 
     ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
     ax->d.next = context->aux;
     context->aux = (void *)ax;
 
     get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns,
                    bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
 
     ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
     ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
     ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
     ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
     ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
 
     ax->old_pcap.permitted   = old->cap_permitted;
     ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
     ax->old_pcap.effective   = old->cap_effective;
     ax->old_pcap.ambient     = old->cap_ambient;
 
     ax->new_pcap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
     ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
     ax->new_pcap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
     ax->new_pcap.ambient     = new->cap_ambient;
     return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
  * @new: the new credentials
  * @old: the old (current) credentials
  *
  * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
  * audit system if applicable
  */
 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
     context->capset.cap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
     context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
     context->capset.cap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
     context->capset.cap.ambient     = new->cap_ambient;
     context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
 }
 
 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->mmap.fd = fd;
     context->mmap.flags = flags;
     context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
 }
 
 void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->openat2.flags = how->flags;
     context->openat2.mode = how->mode;
     context->openat2.resolve = how->resolve;
     context->type = AUDIT_OPENAT2;
 }
 
 void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
     if (!context->module.name)
         audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
     context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
 }
 
 void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
 {
     audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
         AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
 }
 
 void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 
     /* only set type if not already set by NTP */
     if (!context->type)
         context->type = AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET;
     memcpy(&context->time.tk_injoffset, &offset, sizeof(offset));
 }
 
 void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
 {
     struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
     int type;
 
     for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++)
         if (ad->vals[type].newval != ad->vals[type].oldval) {
             /* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */
             context->type = AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL;
             memcpy(&context->time.ntp_data, ad, sizeof(*ad));
             break;
         }
 }
 
 void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
                enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp)
 {
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
     char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
 
     ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
     if (!ab)
         return;
     audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
              name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);
 
     audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_pid_nr(current));
     audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
     audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
     audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
     audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
 
 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
     kuid_t auid, uid;
     kgid_t gid;
     unsigned int sessionid;
     char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
 
     auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
     sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
     current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
 
     audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
              from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
              from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
              sessionid);
     audit_log_task_context(ab);
     audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
     audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
     audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
  * @signr: signal value
  *
  * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
  * should record the event for investigation.
  */
 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
 {
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
     if (!audit_enabled)
         return;
 
     if (signr == SIGQUIT)   /* don't care for those */
         return;
 
     ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
     if (unlikely(!ab))
         return;
     audit_log_task(ab);
     audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
     audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
  * @syscall: syscall number
  * @signr: signal value
  * @code: the seccomp action
  *
  * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
  * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
  * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
  * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
  * audit is not in use.
  */
 void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
 {
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
     ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
     if (unlikely(!ab))
         return;
     audit_log_task(ab);
     audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
              signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
              in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
     audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
 void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
                   int res)
 {
     struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
     if (!audit_enabled)
         return;
 
     ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
                  AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
     if (unlikely(!ab))
         return;
 
     audit_log_format(ab,
              "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
              names, old_names, res);
     audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
 {
     struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
     if (likely(!ctx || ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED))
         return NULL;
     return &ctx->killed_trees;
 }