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	Version: linux-6.0.1 spark-3.0.0 hadoop-3.2.0-src hadoop-3.3.0-src spark-2.4.7 linux-4.15.13 hadoop-2.7.4-src Revert   Change

 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 /*
  * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
  *
  * AMD SVM-SEV support
  *
  * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
  */
 
 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
 #include <linux/processor.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
 
 #include <asm/pkru.h>
 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
 
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "x86.h"
 #include "svm.h"
 #include "svm_ops.h"
 #include "cpuid.h"
 #include "trace.h"
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 /*
  * When this config is not defined, SEV feature is not supported and APIs in
  * this file are not used but this file still gets compiled into the KVM AMD
  * module.
  *
  * We will not have MISC_CG_RES_SEV and MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES entries in the enum
  * misc_res_type {} defined in linux/misc_cgroup.h.
  *
  * Below macros allow compilation to succeed.
  */
 #define MISC_CG_RES_SEV MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
 #define MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 /* enable/disable SEV support */
 static bool sev_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
 static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 #else
 #define sev_enabled false
 #define sev_es_enabled false
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
 unsigned int max_sev_asid;
 static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
 static unsigned long sev_me_mask;
 static unsigned int nr_asids;
 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
 static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
 
 struct enc_region {
     struct list_head list;
     unsigned long npages;
     struct page **pages;
     unsigned long uaddr;
     unsigned long size;
 };
 
 /* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown  */
 static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
 {
     int ret, asid, error = 0;
 
     /* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
     asid = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids, min_asid);
     if (asid > max_asid)
         return -EBUSY;
 
     /*
      * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
      * so it must be guarded.
      */
     down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
 
     wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
     ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
 
     up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
 
     if (ret)
         pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
     return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner;
 }
 
 /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
 static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
 {
     if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid))
         return false;
 
     /* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
     bitmap_xor(sev_asid_bitmap, sev_asid_bitmap, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap,
            nr_asids);
     bitmap_zero(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids);
 
     return true;
 }
 
 static int sev_misc_cg_try_charge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
 {
     enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
     return misc_cg_try_charge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
 }
 
 static void sev_misc_cg_uncharge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
 {
     enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
     misc_cg_uncharge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
 }
 
 static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
 {
     int asid, min_asid, max_asid, ret;
     bool retry = true;
 
     WARN_ON(sev->misc_cg);
     sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
     ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(sev);
     if (ret) {
         put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
         sev->misc_cg = NULL;
         return ret;
     }
 
     mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
 
     /*
      * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
      * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1.
      */
     min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid;
     max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
 again:
     asid = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_asid + 1, min_asid);
     if (asid > max_asid) {
         if (retry && __sev_recycle_asids(min_asid, max_asid)) {
             retry = false;
             goto again;
         }
         mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
         ret = -EBUSY;
         goto e_uncharge;
     }
 
     __set_bit(asid, sev_asid_bitmap);
 
     mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
 
     return asid;
 e_uncharge:
     sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
     put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
     sev->misc_cg = NULL;
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
 
     return sev->asid;
 }
 
 static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
 {
     struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
     int cpu;
 
     mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
 
     __set_bit(sev->asid, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
 
     for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
         sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
         sd->sev_vmcbs[sev->asid] = NULL;
     }
 
     mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
 
     sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
     put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
     sev->misc_cg = NULL;
 }
 
 static void sev_decommission(unsigned int handle)
 {
     struct sev_data_decommission decommission;
 
     if (!handle)
         return;
 
     decommission.handle = handle;
     sev_guest_decommission(&decommission, NULL);
 }
 
 static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
 {
     struct sev_data_deactivate deactivate;
 
     if (!handle)
         return;
 
     deactivate.handle = handle;
 
     /* Guard DEACTIVATE against WBINVD/DF_FLUSH used in ASID recycling */
     down_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
     sev_guest_deactivate(&deactivate, NULL);
     up_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
 
     sev_decommission(handle);
 }
 
 static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     int asid, ret;
 
     if (kvm->created_vcpus)
         return -EINVAL;
 
     ret = -EBUSY;
     if (unlikely(sev->active))
         return ret;
 
     sev->active = true;
     sev->es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
     asid = sev_asid_new(sev);
     if (asid < 0)
         goto e_no_asid;
     sev->asid = asid;
 
     ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
     if (ret)
         goto e_free;
 
     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->mirror_vms);
 
     kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_SEV);
 
     return 0;
 
 e_free:
     sev_asid_free(sev);
     sev->asid = 0;
 e_no_asid:
     sev->es_active = false;
     sev->active = false;
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
 {
     struct sev_data_activate activate;
     int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
     int ret;
 
     /* activate ASID on the given handle */
     activate.handle = handle;
     activate.asid   = asid;
     ret = sev_guest_activate(&activate, error);
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
 {
     struct fd f;
     int ret;
 
     f = fdget(fd);
     if (!f.file)
         return -EBADF;
 
     ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
 
     fdput(f);
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
 
     return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
 }
 
 static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_launch_start start;
     struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
     void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
     int *error = &argp->error;
     int ret;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
 
     dh_blob = NULL;
     if (params.dh_uaddr) {
         dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
         if (IS_ERR(dh_blob))
             return PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
 
         start.dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
         start.dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
     }
 
     session_blob = NULL;
     if (params.session_uaddr) {
         session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
         if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
             ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
             goto e_free_dh;
         }
 
         start.session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
         start.session_len = params.session_len;
     }
 
     start.handle = params.handle;
     start.policy = params.policy;
 
     /* create memory encryption context */
     ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, &start, error);
     if (ret)
         goto e_free_session;
 
     /* Bind ASID to this guest */
     ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
     if (ret) {
         sev_decommission(start.handle);
         goto e_free_session;
     }
 
     /* return handle to userspace */
     params.handle = start.handle;
     if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params, sizeof(params))) {
         sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
         ret = -EFAULT;
         goto e_free_session;
     }
 
     sev->handle = start.handle;
     sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
 
 e_free_session:
     kfree(session_blob);
 e_free_dh:
     kfree(dh_blob);
     return ret;
 }
 
 static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
                     unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
                     int write)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     unsigned long npages, size;
     int npinned;
     unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
     struct page **pages;
     unsigned long first, last;
     int ret;
 
     lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
 
     if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
         return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
     /* Calculate number of pages. */
     first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
     last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
     npages = (last - first + 1);
 
     locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
     lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
     if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
         pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
         return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
     }
 
     if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages > INT_MAX))
         return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
     /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
     size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
     if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
         pages = __vmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
     else
         pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 
     if (!pages)
         return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
     /* Pin the user virtual address. */
     npinned = pin_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
     if (npinned != npages) {
         pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
         ret = -ENOMEM;
         goto err;
     }
 
     *n = npages;
     sev->pages_locked = locked;
 
     return pages;
 
 err:
     if (npinned > 0)
         unpin_user_pages(pages, npinned);
 
     kvfree(pages);
     return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
 
 static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
                  unsigned long npages)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
 
     unpin_user_pages(pages, npages);
     kvfree(pages);
     sev->pages_locked -= npages;
 }
 
 static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
 {
     uint8_t *page_virtual;
     unsigned long i;
 
     if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT) || npages == 0 ||
         pages == NULL)
         return;
 
     for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
         page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
         clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
         kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
         cond_resched();
     }
 }
 
 static unsigned long get_num_contig_pages(unsigned long idx,
                 struct page **inpages, unsigned long npages)
 {
     unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
     unsigned long i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
 
     /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
     paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
     while (i < npages) {
         next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
         if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
             pages++;
             paddr = next_paddr;
             continue;
         }
         break;
     }
 
     return pages;
 }
 
 static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, pages, size, i;
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
     struct sev_data_launch_update_data data;
     struct page **inpages;
     int ret;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     vaddr = params.uaddr;
     size = params.len;
     vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
 
     /* Lock the user memory. */
     inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
     if (IS_ERR(inpages))
         return PTR_ERR(inpages);
 
     /*
      * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in
      * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
      */
     sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
 
     data.reserved = 0;
     data.handle = sev->handle;
 
     for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
         int offset, len;
 
         /*
          * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
          * within the page.
          */
         offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
 
         /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
         pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
 
         len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
 
         data.len = len;
         data.address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
         ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
         if (ret)
             goto e_unpin;
 
         size -= len;
         next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
     }
 
 e_unpin:
     /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
     for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
         set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
         mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
     }
     /* unlock the user pages */
     sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
 
     /* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
     if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (svm->vmcb->save.dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
         return -EINVAL;
 
     /*
      * SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not
      * the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the
      * traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep
      * for LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA) to be the initial SEV-ES state.
      */
     memcpy(save, &svm->vmcb->save, sizeof(svm->vmcb->save));
 
     /* Sync registgers */
     save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
     save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
     save->rcx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
     save->rdx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
     save->rsp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
     save->rbp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
     save->rsi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
     save->rdi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
     save->r8  = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8];
     save->r9  = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9];
     save->r10 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10];
     save->r11 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11];
     save->r12 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12];
     save->r13 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13];
     save->r14 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14];
     save->r15 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15];
 #endif
     save->rip = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
 
     /* Sync some non-GPR registers before encrypting */
     save->xcr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.xcr0;
     save->pkru = svm->vcpu.arch.pkru;
     save->xss  = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
     save->dr6  = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
 
     pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");
     print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false);
 
     return 0;
 }
 
 static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                     int *error)
 {
     struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
     struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
     int ret;
 
     /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
     ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
     if (ret)
         return ret;
 
     /*
      * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place encryption of
      * the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region
      * with the guest's key), so invalidate it first.
      */
     clflush_cache_range(svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
 
     vmsa.reserved = 0;
     vmsa.handle = to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.handle;
     vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
     vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error);
     if (ret)
       return ret;
 
     vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
     return 0;
 }
 
 static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
     unsigned long i;
     int ret;
 
     if (!sev_es_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
         ret = mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex);
         if (ret)
             return ret;
 
         ret = __sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, vcpu, &argp->error);
 
         mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
         if (ret)
             return ret;
     }
 
     return 0;
 }
 
 static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_launch_measure data;
     struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
     void __user *p = NULL;
     void *blob = NULL;
     int ret;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&params, measure, sizeof(params)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
 
     /* User wants to query the blob length */
     if (!params.len)
         goto cmd;
 
     p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
     if (p) {
         if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
             return -EINVAL;
 
         blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
         if (!blob)
             return -ENOMEM;
 
         data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
         data.len = params.len;
     }
 
 cmd:
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &data, &argp->error);
 
     /*
      * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
      */
     if (!params.len)
         goto done;
 
     if (ret)
         goto e_free_blob;
 
     if (blob) {
         if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
             ret = -EFAULT;
     }
 
 done:
     params.len = data.len;
     if (copy_to_user(measure, &params, sizeof(params)))
         ret = -EFAULT;
 e_free_blob:
     kfree(blob);
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_launch_finish data;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
 }
 
 static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
     struct sev_data_guest_status data;
     int ret;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
 
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, &data, &argp->error);
     if (ret)
         return ret;
 
     params.policy = data.policy;
     params.state = data.state;
     params.handle = data.handle;
 
     if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params, sizeof(params)))
         ret = -EFAULT;
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
                    unsigned long dst, int size,
                    int *error, bool enc)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_dbg data;
 
     data.reserved = 0;
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     data.dst_addr = dst;
     data.src_addr = src;
     data.len = size;
 
     return sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
                  enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
                  &data, error);
 }
 
 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
                  unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
 {
     int offset;
 
     /*
      * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
      * destination has enough space.
      */
     offset = src_paddr & 15;
     src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
     sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
 
     return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
 }
 
 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
                   void __user *dst_uaddr,
                   unsigned long dst_paddr,
                   int size, int *err)
 {
     struct page *tpage = NULL;
     int ret, offset;
 
     /* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
     if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
         !IS_ALIGNED(paddr,     16) ||
         !IS_ALIGNED(size,      16)) {
         tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
         if (!tpage)
             return -ENOMEM;
 
         dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
     }
 
     ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
     if (ret)
         goto e_free;
 
     if (tpage) {
         offset = paddr & 15;
         if (copy_to_user(dst_uaddr, page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
             ret = -EFAULT;
     }
 
 e_free:
     if (tpage)
         __free_page(tpage);
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
                   void __user *vaddr,
                   unsigned long dst_paddr,
                   void __user *dst_vaddr,
                   int size, int *error)
 {
     struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
     struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
     int ret, len = size;
 
     /* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
     if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)vaddr, 16)) {
         src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
         if (!src_tpage)
             return -ENOMEM;
 
         if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage), vaddr, size)) {
             __free_page(src_tpage);
             return -EFAULT;
         }
 
         paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
     }
 
     /*
      *  If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
      *   - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
      *   - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
      *   - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
      */
     if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
         int dst_offset;
 
         dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
         if (!dst_tpage) {
             ret = -ENOMEM;
             goto e_free;
         }
 
         ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
                     __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
         if (ret)
             goto e_free;
 
         /*
          *  If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
          *  copy_from_user().
          */
         dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
 
         if (src_tpage)
             memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
                    page_address(src_tpage), size);
         else {
             if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
                        vaddr, size)) {
                 ret = -EFAULT;
                 goto e_free;
             }
         }
 
         paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
         dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
         len = round_up(size, 16);
     }
 
     ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
 
 e_free:
     if (src_tpage)
         __free_page(src_tpage);
     if (dst_tpage)
         __free_page(dst_tpage);
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
 {
     unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
     unsigned long dst_vaddr;
     struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
     struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
     unsigned long n;
     unsigned int size;
     int ret;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     if (!debug.len || debug.src_uaddr + debug.len < debug.src_uaddr)
         return -EINVAL;
     if (!debug.dst_uaddr)
         return -EINVAL;
 
     vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
     size = debug.len;
     vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
     dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
 
     for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
         int len, s_off, d_off;
 
         /* lock userspace source and destination page */
         src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
         if (IS_ERR(src_p))
             return PTR_ERR(src_p);
 
         dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
         if (IS_ERR(dst_p)) {
             sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
             return PTR_ERR(dst_p);
         }
 
         /*
          * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT read or modify
          * the pages; flush the destination too so that future accesses do not
          * see stale data.
          */
         sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
         sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
 
         /*
          * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
          * offset within the page.
          */
         s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
         d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
         len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
 
         if (dec)
             ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
                              __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
                              (void __user *)dst_vaddr,
                              __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
                              len, &argp->error);
         else
             ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
                              __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
                              (void __user *)vaddr,
                              __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
                              (void __user *)dst_vaddr,
                              len, &argp->error);
 
         sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
         sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, n);
 
         if (ret)
             goto err;
 
         next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
         dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
         size -= len;
     }
 err:
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_launch_secret data;
     struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
     struct page **pages;
     void *blob, *hdr;
     unsigned long n, i;
     int ret, offset;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
     if (IS_ERR(pages))
         return PTR_ERR(pages);
 
     /*
      * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_SECRET encrypts pages in
      * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
      */
     sev_clflush_pages(pages, n);
 
     /*
      * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
      * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
      */
     if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
         ret = -EINVAL;
         goto e_unpin_memory;
     }
 
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
 
     offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
     data.guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
     data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
 
     blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
     if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
         ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
         goto e_unpin_memory;
     }
 
     data.trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
     data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
 
     hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
     if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
         ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
         goto e_free_blob;
     }
     data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
     data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
 
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, &data, &argp->error);
 
     kfree(hdr);
 
 e_free_blob:
     kfree(blob);
 e_unpin_memory:
     /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
     for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
         set_page_dirty_lock(pages[i]);
         mark_page_accessed(pages[i]);
     }
     sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     void __user *report = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_attestation_report data;
     struct kvm_sev_attestation_report params;
     void __user *p;
     void *blob = NULL;
     int ret;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
 
     /* User wants to query the blob length */
     if (!params.len)
         goto cmd;
 
     p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
     if (p) {
         if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
             return -EINVAL;
 
         blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
         if (!blob)
             return -ENOMEM;
 
         data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
         data.len = params.len;
         memcpy(data.mnonce, params.mnonce, sizeof(params.mnonce));
     }
 cmd:
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT, &data, &argp->error);
     /*
      * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
      */
     if (!params.len)
         goto done;
 
     if (ret)
         goto e_free_blob;
 
     if (blob) {
         if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
             ret = -EFAULT;
     }
 
 done:
     params.len = data.len;
     if (copy_to_user(report, &params, sizeof(params)))
         ret = -EFAULT;
 e_free_blob:
     kfree(blob);
     return ret;
 }
 
 /* Userspace wants to query session length. */
 static int
 __sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
                       struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_send_start data;
     int ret;
 
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
 
     params->session_len = data.session_len;
     if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
                 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
         ret = -EFAULT;
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_send_start data;
     struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
     void *amd_certs, *session_data;
     void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
     int ret;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
                 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     /* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
     if (!params.session_len)
         return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
                 &params);
 
     /* some sanity checks */
     if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
         !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
         return -EINVAL;
 
     /* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
     session_data = kzalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
     if (!session_data)
         return -ENOMEM;
 
     /* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
     pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
                 params.pdh_cert_len);
     if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
         ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
         goto e_free_session;
     }
 
     plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
                 params.plat_certs_len);
     if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
         ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
         goto e_free_pdh;
     }
 
     amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
                 params.amd_certs_len);
     if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
         ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
         goto e_free_plat_cert;
     }
 
     /* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
     data.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
     data.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
     data.plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
     data.plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
     data.amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
     data.amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
     data.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
     data.session_len = params.session_len;
     data.handle = sev->handle;
 
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
 
     if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,
             session_data, params.session_len)) {
         ret = -EFAULT;
         goto e_free_amd_cert;
     }
 
     params.policy = data.policy;
     params.session_len = data.session_len;
     if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params,
                 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
         ret = -EFAULT;
 
 e_free_amd_cert:
     kfree(amd_certs);
 e_free_plat_cert:
     kfree(plat_certs);
 e_free_pdh:
     kfree(pdh_cert);
 e_free_session:
     kfree(session_data);
     return ret;
 }
 
 /* Userspace wants to query either header or trans length. */
 static int
 __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
                      struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *params)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
     int ret;
 
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
 
     params->hdr_len = data.hdr_len;
     params->trans_len = data.trans_len;
 
     if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
              sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
         ret = -EFAULT;
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
     struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params;
     void *hdr, *trans_data;
     struct page **guest_page;
     unsigned long n;
     int ret, offset;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
             sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     /* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */
     if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len)
         return __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(kvm, argp, &params);
 
     if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr ||
         !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr)
         return -EINVAL;
 
     /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
     offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
     if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
         return -EINVAL;
 
     /* Pin guest memory */
     guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
                     PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
     if (IS_ERR(guest_page))
         return PTR_ERR(guest_page);
 
     /* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */
     ret = -ENOMEM;
     hdr = kzalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
     if (!hdr)
         goto e_unpin;
 
     trans_data = kzalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
     if (!trans_data)
         goto e_free_hdr;
 
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
     data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
     data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
     data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data);
     data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
 
     /* The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
     data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
     data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
     data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
     data.handle = sev->handle;
 
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
 
     if (ret)
         goto e_free_trans_data;
 
     /* copy transport buffer to user space */
     if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr,
              trans_data, params.trans_len)) {
         ret = -EFAULT;
         goto e_free_trans_data;
     }
 
     /* Copy packet header to userspace. */
     if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr,
              params.hdr_len))
         ret = -EFAULT;
 
 e_free_trans_data:
     kfree(trans_data);
 e_free_hdr:
     kfree(hdr);
 e_unpin:
     sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_send_finish data;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
 }
 
 static int sev_send_cancel(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_send_cancel data;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL, &data, &argp->error);
 }
 
 static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_receive_start start;
     struct kvm_sev_receive_start params;
     int *error = &argp->error;
     void *session_data;
     void *pdh_data;
     int ret;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     /* Get parameter from the userspace */
     if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
             sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     /* some sanity checks */
     if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len ||
         !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len)
         return -EINVAL;
 
     pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len);
     if (IS_ERR(pdh_data))
         return PTR_ERR(pdh_data);
 
     session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr,
             params.session_len);
     if (IS_ERR(session_data)) {
         ret = PTR_ERR(session_data);
         goto e_free_pdh;
     }
 
     memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
     start.handle = params.handle;
     start.policy = params.policy;
     start.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data);
     start.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len;
     start.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
     start.session_len = params.session_len;
 
     /* create memory encryption context */
     ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, &start,
                 error);
     if (ret)
         goto e_free_session;
 
     /* Bind ASID to this guest */
     ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
     if (ret) {
         sev_decommission(start.handle);
         goto e_free_session;
     }
 
     params.handle = start.handle;
     if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
              &params, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) {
         ret = -EFAULT;
         sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
         goto e_free_session;
     }
 
         sev->handle = start.handle;
     sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
 
 e_free_session:
     kfree(session_data);
 e_free_pdh:
     kfree(pdh_data);
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params;
     struct sev_data_receive_update_data data;
     void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
     struct page **guest_page;
     unsigned long n;
     int ret, offset;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -EINVAL;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
             sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len ||
         !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len ||
         !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len)
         return -EINVAL;
 
     /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
     offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
     if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
         return -EINVAL;
 
     hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
     if (IS_ERR(hdr))
         return PTR_ERR(hdr);
 
     trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
     if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
         ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
         goto e_free_hdr;
     }
 
     memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
     data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
     data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
     data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans);
     data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
 
     /* Pin guest memory */
     guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
                     PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
     if (IS_ERR(guest_page)) {
         ret = PTR_ERR(guest_page);
         goto e_free_trans;
     }
 
     /*
      * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, the PSP
      * encrypts the written data with the guest's key, and the cache may
      * contain dirty, unencrypted data.
      */
     sev_clflush_pages(guest_page, n);
 
     /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
     data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
     data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
     data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
     data.handle = sev->handle;
 
     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, &data,
                 &argp->error);
 
     sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
 
 e_free_trans:
     kfree(trans);
 e_free_hdr:
     kfree(hdr);
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct sev_data_receive_finish data;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     data.handle = sev->handle;
     return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
 }
 
 static bool is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(u32 cmd_id)
 {
     /*
      * Allow mirrors VM to call KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA to enable SEV-ES
      * active mirror VMs. Also allow the debugging and status commands.
      */
     if (cmd_id == KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA ||
         cmd_id == KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS || cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT ||
         cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT)
         return true;
 
     return false;
 }
 
 static int sev_lock_two_vms(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
     struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
     int r = -EBUSY;
 
     if (dst_kvm == src_kvm)
         return -EINVAL;
 
     /*
      * Bail if these VMs are already involved in a migration to avoid
      * deadlock between two VMs trying to migrate to/from each other.
      */
     if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0, 1))
         return -EBUSY;
 
     if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0, 1))
         goto release_dst;
 
     r = -EINTR;
     if (mutex_lock_killable(&dst_kvm->lock))
         goto release_src;
     if (mutex_lock_killable_nested(&src_kvm->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING))
         goto unlock_dst;
     return 0;
 
 unlock_dst:
     mutex_unlock(&dst_kvm->lock);
 release_src:
     atomic_set_release(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
 release_dst:
     atomic_set_release(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
     return r;
 }
 
 static void sev_unlock_two_vms(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
     struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
 
     mutex_unlock(&dst_kvm->lock);
     mutex_unlock(&src_kvm->lock);
     atomic_set_release(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
     atomic_set_release(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
 }
 
 /* vCPU mutex subclasses.  */
 enum sev_migration_role {
     SEV_MIGRATION_SOURCE = 0,
     SEV_MIGRATION_TARGET,
     SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES,
 };
 
 static int sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm,
                     enum sev_migration_role role)
 {
     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
     unsigned long i, j;
 
     kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
         if (mutex_lock_killable_nested(&vcpu->mutex, role))
             goto out_unlock;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
         if (!i)
             /*
              * Reset the role to one that avoids colliding with
              * the role used for the first vcpu mutex.
              */
             role = SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES;
         else
             mutex_release(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map, _THIS_IP_);
 #endif
     }
 
     return 0;
 
 out_unlock:
 
     kvm_for_each_vcpu(j, vcpu, kvm) {
         if (i == j)
             break;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
         if (j)
             mutex_acquire(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map, role, 0, _THIS_IP_);
 #endif
 
         mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
     }
     return -EINTR;
 }
 
 static void sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
     unsigned long i;
     bool first = true;
 
     kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
         if (first)
             first = false;
         else
             mutex_acquire(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map,
                       SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES, 0, _THIS_IP_);
 
         mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
     }
 }
 
 static void sev_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *dst = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
     struct kvm_sev_info *src = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
     struct kvm_vcpu *dst_vcpu, *src_vcpu;
     struct vcpu_svm *dst_svm, *src_svm;
     struct kvm_sev_info *mirror;
     unsigned long i;
 
     dst->active = true;
     dst->asid = src->asid;
     dst->handle = src->handle;
     dst->pages_locked = src->pages_locked;
     dst->enc_context_owner = src->enc_context_owner;
     dst->es_active = src->es_active;
 
     src->asid = 0;
     src->active = false;
     src->handle = 0;
     src->pages_locked = 0;
     src->enc_context_owner = NULL;
     src->es_active = false;
 
     list_cut_before(&dst->regions_list, &src->regions_list, &src->regions_list);
 
     /*
      * If this VM has mirrors, "transfer" each mirror's refcount of the
      * source to the destination (this KVM).  The caller holds a reference
      * to the source, so there's no danger of use-after-free.
      */
     list_cut_before(&dst->mirror_vms, &src->mirror_vms, &src->mirror_vms);
     list_for_each_entry(mirror, &dst->mirror_vms, mirror_entry) {
         kvm_get_kvm(dst_kvm);
         kvm_put_kvm(src_kvm);
         mirror->enc_context_owner = dst_kvm;
     }
 
     /*
      * If this VM is a mirror, remove the old mirror from the owners list
      * and add the new mirror to the list.
      */
     if (is_mirroring_enc_context(dst_kvm)) {
         struct kvm_sev_info *owner_sev_info =
             &to_kvm_svm(dst->enc_context_owner)->sev_info;
 
         list_del(&src->mirror_entry);
         list_add_tail(&dst->mirror_entry, &owner_sev_info->mirror_vms);
     }
 
     kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, dst_vcpu, dst_kvm) {
         dst_svm = to_svm(dst_vcpu);
 
         sev_init_vmcb(dst_svm);
 
         if (!dst->es_active)
             continue;
 
         /*
          * Note, the source is not required to have the same number of
          * vCPUs as the destination when migrating a vanilla SEV VM.
          */
         src_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(dst_kvm, i);
         src_svm = to_svm(src_vcpu);
 
         /*
          * Transfer VMSA and GHCB state to the destination.  Nullify and
          * clear source fields as appropriate, the state now belongs to
          * the destination.
          */
         memcpy(&dst_svm->sev_es, &src_svm->sev_es, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
         dst_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa;
         dst_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa;
         dst_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
 
         memset(&src_svm->sev_es, 0, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
         src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
         src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
         src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = false;
     }
 }
 
 static int sev_check_source_vcpus(struct kvm *dst, struct kvm *src)
 {
     struct kvm_vcpu *src_vcpu;
     unsigned long i;
 
     if (!sev_es_guest(src))
         return 0;
 
     if (atomic_read(&src->online_vcpus) != atomic_read(&dst->online_vcpus))
         return -EINVAL;
 
     kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, src_vcpu, src) {
         if (!src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
             return -EINVAL;
     }
 
     return 0;
 }
 
 int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev, *cg_cleanup_sev;
     struct file *source_kvm_file;
     struct kvm *source_kvm;
     bool charged = false;
     int ret;
 
     source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd);
     if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) {
         ret = -EBADF;
         goto out_fput;
     }
 
     source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data;
     ret = sev_lock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
     if (ret)
         goto out_fput;
 
     if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
         ret = -EINVAL;
         goto out_unlock;
     }
 
     src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info;
 
     dst_sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
     cg_cleanup_sev = dst_sev;
     if (dst_sev->misc_cg != src_sev->misc_cg) {
         ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(dst_sev);
         if (ret)
             goto out_dst_cgroup;
         charged = true;
     }
 
     ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm, SEV_MIGRATION_SOURCE);
     if (ret)
         goto out_dst_cgroup;
     ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm, SEV_MIGRATION_TARGET);
     if (ret)
         goto out_dst_vcpu;
 
     ret = sev_check_source_vcpus(kvm, source_kvm);
     if (ret)
         goto out_source_vcpu;
 
     sev_migrate_from(kvm, source_kvm);
     kvm_vm_dead(source_kvm);
     cg_cleanup_sev = src_sev;
     ret = 0;
 
 out_source_vcpu:
     sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm);
 out_dst_vcpu:
     sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm);
 out_dst_cgroup:
     /* Operates on the source on success, on the destination on failure.  */
     if (charged)
         sev_misc_cg_uncharge(cg_cleanup_sev);
     put_misc_cg(cg_cleanup_sev->misc_cg);
     cg_cleanup_sev->misc_cg = NULL;
 out_unlock:
     sev_unlock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
 out_fput:
     if (source_kvm_file)
         fput(source_kvm_file);
     return ret;
 }
 
 int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
     int r;
 
     if (!sev_enabled)
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     if (!argp)
         return 0;
 
     if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
         return -EFAULT;
 
     mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 
     /* Only the enc_context_owner handles some memory enc operations. */
     if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm) &&
         !is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(sev_cmd.id)) {
         r = -EINVAL;
         goto out;
     }
 
     switch (sev_cmd.id) {
     case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT:
         if (!sev_es_enabled) {
             r = -ENOTTY;
             goto out;
         }
         fallthrough;
     case KVM_SEV_INIT:
         r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
         r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
         r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
         r = sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
         r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
         r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
         r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
         r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
         r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
         r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
         r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
         r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
         r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH:
         r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL:
         r = sev_send_cancel(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START:
         r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
         r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
         r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
         break;
     default:
         r = -EINVAL;
         goto out;
     }
 
     if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
         r = -EFAULT;
 
 out:
     mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
     return r;
 }
 
 int sev_mem_enc_register_region(struct kvm *kvm,
                 struct kvm_enc_region *range)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct enc_region *region;
     int ret = 0;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return -ENOTTY;
 
     /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
     if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
         return -EINVAL;
 
     if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
         return -EINVAL;
 
     region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
     if (!region)
         return -ENOMEM;
 
     mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
     region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, &region->npages, 1);
     if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) {
         ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages);
         mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
         goto e_free;
     }
 
     region->uaddr = range->addr;
     region->size = range->size;
 
     list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list);
     mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 
     /*
      * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
      * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
      * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
      * correct C-bit.
      */
     sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
 
     return ret;
 
 e_free:
     kfree(region);
     return ret;
 }
 
 static struct enc_region *
 find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
     struct enc_region *i;
 
     list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
         if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
             i->size == range->size)
             return i;
     }
 
     return NULL;
 }
 
 static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
                        struct enc_region *region)
 {
     sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
     list_del(&region->list);
     kfree(region);
 }
 
 int sev_mem_enc_unregister_region(struct kvm *kvm,
                   struct kvm_enc_region *range)
 {
     struct enc_region *region;
     int ret;
 
     /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
     if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
         return -EINVAL;
 
     mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
         ret = -ENOTTY;
         goto failed;
     }
 
     region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
     if (!region) {
         ret = -EINVAL;
         goto failed;
     }
 
     /*
      * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
      * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
      * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
      */
     wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
 
     __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
 
     mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
     return 0;
 
 failed:
     mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
     return ret;
 }
 
 int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
 {
     struct file *source_kvm_file;
     struct kvm *source_kvm;
     struct kvm_sev_info *source_sev, *mirror_sev;
     int ret;
 
     source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd);
     if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) {
         ret = -EBADF;
         goto e_source_fput;
     }
 
     source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data;
     ret = sev_lock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
     if (ret)
         goto e_source_fput;
 
     /*
      * Mirrors of mirrors should work, but let's not get silly.  Also
      * disallow out-of-band SEV/SEV-ES init if the target is already an
      * SEV guest, or if vCPUs have been created.  KVM relies on vCPUs being
      * created after SEV/SEV-ES initialization, e.g. to init intercepts.
      */
     if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm) ||
         is_mirroring_enc_context(source_kvm) || kvm->created_vcpus) {
         ret = -EINVAL;
         goto e_unlock;
     }
 
     /*
      * The mirror kvm holds an enc_context_owner ref so its asid can't
      * disappear until we're done with it
      */
     source_sev = &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info;
     kvm_get_kvm(source_kvm);
     mirror_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     list_add_tail(&mirror_sev->mirror_entry, &source_sev->mirror_vms);
 
     /* Set enc_context_owner and copy its encryption context over */
     mirror_sev->enc_context_owner = source_kvm;
     mirror_sev->active = true;
     mirror_sev->asid = source_sev->asid;
     mirror_sev->fd = source_sev->fd;
     mirror_sev->es_active = source_sev->es_active;
     mirror_sev->handle = source_sev->handle;
     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->regions_list);
     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->mirror_vms);
     ret = 0;
 
     /*
      * Do not copy ap_jump_table. Since the mirror does not share the same
      * KVM contexts as the original, and they may have different
      * memory-views.
      */
 
 e_unlock:
     sev_unlock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
 e_source_fput:
     if (source_kvm_file)
         fput(source_kvm_file);
     return ret;
 }
 
 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
     struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
     struct list_head *pos, *q;
 
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return;
 
     WARN_ON(!list_empty(&sev->mirror_vms));
 
     /* If this is a mirror_kvm release the enc_context_owner and skip sev cleanup */
     if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) {
         struct kvm *owner_kvm = sev->enc_context_owner;
 
         mutex_lock(&owner_kvm->lock);
         list_del(&sev->mirror_entry);
         mutex_unlock(&owner_kvm->lock);
         kvm_put_kvm(owner_kvm);
         return;
     }
 
     /*
      * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
      * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
      * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
      */
     wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
 
     /*
      * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
      * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
      */
     if (!list_empty(head)) {
         list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
             __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
                 list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
             cond_resched();
         }
     }
 
     sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
     sev_asid_free(sev);
 }
 
 void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
 {
     if (!sev_enabled)
         kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
     if (!sev_es_enabled)
         kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
 }
 
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
     unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
     bool sev_es_supported = false;
     bool sev_supported = false;
 
     if (!sev_enabled || !npt_enabled)
         goto out;
 
     /*
      * SEV must obviously be supported in hardware.  Sanity check that the
      * CPU supports decode assists, which is mandatory for SEV guests to
      * support instruction emulation.
      */
     if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV) ||
         WARN_ON_ONCE(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS)))
         goto out;
 
     /* Retrieve SEV CPUID information */
     cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
 
     /* Set encryption bit location for SEV-ES guests */
     sev_enc_bit = ebx & 0x3f;
 
     /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
     max_sev_asid = ecx;
     if (!max_sev_asid)
         goto out;
 
     /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
     min_sev_asid = edx;
     sev_me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
 
     /*
      * Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps. Allocate space for ASID 0 in the bitmap,
      * even though it's never used, so that the bitmap is indexed by the
      * actual ASID.
      */
     nr_asids = max_sev_asid + 1;
     sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
     if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
         goto out;
 
     sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
     if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
         bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
         sev_asid_bitmap = NULL;
         goto out;
     }
 
     sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
     if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count))
         goto out;
 
     pr_info("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_asid_count);
     sev_supported = true;
 
     /* SEV-ES support requested? */
     if (!sev_es_enabled)
         goto out;
 
     /*
      * SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
      * instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
      * instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
      * (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
      */
     if (!enable_mmio_caching)
         goto out;
 
     /* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
     if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
         goto out;
 
     /* Has the system been allocated ASIDs for SEV-ES? */
     if (min_sev_asid == 1)
         goto out;
 
     sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
     if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count))
         goto out;
 
     pr_info("SEV-ES supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_es_asid_count);
     sev_es_supported = true;
 
 out:
     sev_enabled = sev_supported;
     sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
 #endif
 }
 
 void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
 {
     if (!sev_enabled)
         return;
 
     /* No need to take sev_bitmap_lock, all VMs have been destroyed. */
     sev_flush_asids(1, max_sev_asid);
 
     bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
     bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
 
     misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, 0);
     misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, 0);
 }
 
 int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
 {
     if (!sev_enabled)
         return 0;
 
     sd->sev_vmcbs = kcalloc(nr_asids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
     if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
         return -ENOMEM;
 
     return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
  * returning them to the system.
  */
 static void sev_flush_encrypted_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *va)
 {
     int asid = to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info.asid;
 
     /*
      * Note!  The address must be a kernel address, as regular page walk
      * checks are performed by VM_PAGE_FLUSH, i.e. operating on a user
      * address is non-deterministic and unsafe.  This function deliberately
      * takes a pointer to deter passing in a user address.
      */
     unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)va;
 
     /*
      * If CPU enforced cache coherency for encrypted mappings of the
      * same physical page is supported, use CLFLUSHOPT instead. NOTE: cache
      * flush is still needed in order to work properly with DMA devices.
      */
     if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT)) {
         clflush_cache_range(va, PAGE_SIZE);
         return;
     }
 
     /*
      * VM Page Flush takes a host virtual address and a guest ASID.  Fall
      * back to WBINVD if this faults so as not to make any problems worse
      * by leaving stale encrypted data in the cache.
      */
     if (WARN_ON_ONCE(wrmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH, addr | asid)))
         goto do_wbinvd;
 
     return;
 
 do_wbinvd:
     wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
 }
 
 void sev_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
         return;
 
     wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
 }
 
 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
     struct vcpu_svm *svm;
 
     if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
         return;
 
     svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 
     if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
         sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, svm->sev_es.vmsa);
 
     __free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));
 
     if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free)
         kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
 }
 
 static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
     unsigned int nbits;
 
     /* Re-use the dump_invalid_vmcb module parameter */
     if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
         pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
         return;
     }
 
     nbits = sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap) * 8;
 
     pr_err("GHCB (GPA=%016llx):\n", svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa);
     pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_code",
            ghcb->save.sw_exit_code, ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb));
     pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_1",
            ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1, ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb));
     pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_2",
            ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2, ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb));
     pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_scratch",
            ghcb->save.sw_scratch, ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb));
     pr_err("%-20s%*pb\n", "valid_bitmap", nbits, ghcb->save.valid_bitmap);
 }
 
 static void sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
     struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
 
     /*
      * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
      * to be returned:
      *   GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
      *
      * Copy their values, even if they may not have been written during the
      * VM-Exit.  It's the guest's responsibility to not consume random data.
      */
     ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
     ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX]);
     ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX]);
     ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX]);
 }
 
 static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
     struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
     u64 exit_code;
 
     /*
      * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
      * to be supplied:
      *   GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
      *   XCR0
      *   CPL
      *
      * VMMCALL allows the guest to provide extra registers. KVM also
      * expects RSI for hypercalls, so include that, too.
      *
      * Copy their values to the appropriate location if supplied.
      */
     memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
 
     vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(ghcb);
     vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(ghcb);
     vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(ghcb);
     vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(ghcb);
     vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(ghcb);
 
     svm->vmcb->save.cpl = ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(ghcb);
 
     if (ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb)) {
         vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
         kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
     }
 
     /* Copy the GHCB exit information into the VMCB fields */
     exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
     control->exit_code = lower_32_bits(exit_code);
     control->exit_code_hi = upper_32_bits(exit_code);
     control->exit_info_1 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb);
     control->exit_info_2 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb);
 
     /* Clear the valid entries fields */
     memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
 }
 
 static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
     struct ghcb *ghcb;
     u64 exit_code;
     u64 reason;
 
     ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
 
     /*
      * Retrieve the exit code now even though it may not be marked valid
      * as it could help with debugging.
      */
     exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
 
     /* Only GHCB Usage code 0 is supported */
     if (ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
         reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE;
         goto vmgexit_err;
     }
 
     reason = GHCB_ERR_MISSING_INPUT;
 
     if (!ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb) ||
         !ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb) ||
         !ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb))
         goto vmgexit_err;
 
     switch (ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb)) {
     case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
         if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
             goto vmgexit_err;
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
         if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
             goto vmgexit_err;
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
         if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
             !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
             goto vmgexit_err;
         if (ghcb_get_rax(ghcb) == 0xd)
             if (!ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb))
                 goto vmgexit_err;
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_INVD:
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
         if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) {
             if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
                 goto vmgexit_err;
         } else {
             if (!(ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK))
                 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
                     goto vmgexit_err;
         }
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
         if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
             goto vmgexit_err;
         if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb)) {
             if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
                 !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
                 goto vmgexit_err;
         }
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
         if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
             !ghcb_cpl_is_valid(ghcb))
             goto vmgexit_err;
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
         if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
             !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) ||
             !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
             goto vmgexit_err;
         break;
     case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
         if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
             !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
             goto vmgexit_err;
         break;
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
         if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
             goto vmgexit_err;
         break;
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE:
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
         break;
     default:
         reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
         goto vmgexit_err;
     }
 
     return 0;
 
 vmgexit_err:
     vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
 
     if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE) {
         vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: ghcb usage %#x is not valid\n",
                 ghcb->ghcb_usage);
     } else if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT) {
         vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit code %#llx is not valid\n",
                 exit_code);
     } else {
         vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit code %#llx input is not valid\n",
                 exit_code);
         dump_ghcb(svm);
     }
 
     /* Clear the valid entries fields */
     memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
 
     ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 2);
     ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, reason);
 
     /* Resume the guest to "return" the error code. */
     return 1;
 }
 
 void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
         return;
 
     if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) {
         /*
          * The scratch area lives outside the GHCB, so there is a
          * buffer that, depending on the operation performed, may
          * need to be synced, then freed.
          */
         if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync) {
             kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm,
                     ghcb_get_sw_scratch(svm->sev_es.ghcb),
                     svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
                     svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len);
             svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
         }
 
         kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
         svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = NULL;
         svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = false;
     }
 
     trace_kvm_vmgexit_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id, svm->sev_es.ghcb);
 
     sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(svm);
 
     kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map, true);
     svm->sev_es.ghcb = NULL;
 }
 
 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
 {
     struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
     int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
 
     /* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
     svm->asid = asid;
 
     /*
      * Flush guest TLB:
      *
      * 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
      * 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
      */
     if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
         svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu)
         return;
 
     sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
     svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
     vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
 }
 
 #define GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT     (16ULL * PAGE_SIZE)
 static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
 {
     struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
     struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
     u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
     u64 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end;
     void *scratch_va;
 
     scratch_gpa_beg = ghcb_get_sw_scratch(ghcb);
     if (!scratch_gpa_beg) {
         pr_err("vmgexit: scratch gpa not provided\n");
         goto e_scratch;
     }
 
     scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + len;
     if (scratch_gpa_end < scratch_gpa_beg) {
         pr_err("vmgexit: scratch length (%#llx) not valid for scratch address (%#llx)\n",
                len, scratch_gpa_beg);
         goto e_scratch;
     }
 
     if ((scratch_gpa_beg & PAGE_MASK) == control->ghcb_gpa) {
         /* Scratch area begins within GHCB */
         ghcb_scratch_beg = control->ghcb_gpa +
                    offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
         ghcb_scratch_end = control->ghcb_gpa +
                    offsetof(struct ghcb, reserved_1);
 
         /*
          * If the scratch area begins within the GHCB, it must be
          * completely contained in the GHCB shared buffer area.
          */
         if (scratch_gpa_beg < ghcb_scratch_beg ||
             scratch_gpa_end > ghcb_scratch_end) {
             pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area is outside of GHCB shared buffer area (%#llx - %#llx)\n",
                    scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end);
             goto e_scratch;
         }
 
         scratch_va = (void *)svm->sev_es.ghcb;
         scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
     } else {
         /*
          * The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
          * limit the size
          */
         if (len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
             pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area exceeds KVM limits (%#llx requested, %#llx limit)\n",
                    len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
             goto e_scratch;
         }
         scratch_va = kvzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
         if (!scratch_va)
             return -ENOMEM;
 
         if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, len)) {
             /* Unable to copy scratch area from guest */
             pr_err("vmgexit: kvm_read_guest for scratch area failed\n");
 
             kvfree(scratch_va);
             return -EFAULT;
         }
 
         /*
          * The scratch area is outside the GHCB. The operation will
          * dictate whether the buffer needs to be synced before running
          * the vCPU next time (i.e. a read was requested so the data
          * must be written back to the guest memory).
          */
         svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = sync;
         svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = true;
     }
 
     svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = scratch_va;
     svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = len;
 
     return 0;
 
 e_scratch:
     ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 2);
     ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_SCRATCH_AREA);
 
     return 1;
 }
 
 static void set_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value, u64 mask,
                   unsigned int pos)
 {
     svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa &= ~(mask << pos);
     svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa |= (value & mask) << pos;
 }
 
 static u64 get_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 mask, unsigned int pos)
 {
     return (svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa >> pos) & mask;
 }
 
 static void set_ghcb_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value)
 {
     svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = value;
 }
 
 static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
     u64 ghcb_info;
     int ret = 1;
 
     ghcb_info = control->ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK;
 
     trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_enter(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
                          control->ghcb_gpa);
 
     switch (ghcb_info) {
     case GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ:
         set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
                             GHCB_VERSION_MIN,
                             sev_enc_bit));
         break;
     case GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REQ: {
         u64 cpuid_fn, cpuid_reg, cpuid_value;
 
         cpuid_fn = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
                          GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_MASK,
                          GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_POS);
 
         /* Initialize the registers needed by the CPUID intercept */
         vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = cpuid_fn;
         vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = 0;
 
         ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_CPUID);
         if (!ret) {
             /* Error, keep GHCB MSR value as-is */
             break;
         }
 
         cpuid_reg = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
                           GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_MASK,
                           GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_POS);
         if (cpuid_reg == 0)
             cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
         else if (cpuid_reg == 1)
             cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
         else if (cpuid_reg == 2)
             cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
         else
             cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
 
         set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, cpuid_value,
                   GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_MASK,
                   GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_POS);
 
         set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, GHCB_MSR_CPUID_RESP,
                   GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK,
                   GHCB_MSR_INFO_POS);
         break;
     }
     case GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ: {
         u64 reason_set, reason_code;
 
         reason_set = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
                            GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_MASK,
                            GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS);
         reason_code = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
                         GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_MASK,
                         GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_POS);
         pr_info("SEV-ES guest requested termination: %#llx:%#llx\n",
             reason_set, reason_code);
 
         vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
         vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM;
         vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 1;
         vcpu->run->system_event.data[0] = control->ghcb_gpa;
 
         return 0;
     }
     default:
         /* Error, keep GHCB MSR value as-is */
         break;
     }
 
     trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
                         control->ghcb_gpa, ret);
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
     struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
     struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
     u64 ghcb_gpa, exit_code;
     struct ghcb *ghcb;
     int ret;
 
     /* Validate the GHCB */
     ghcb_gpa = control->ghcb_gpa;
     if (ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
         return sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(svm);
 
     if (!ghcb_gpa) {
         vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: GHCB gpa is not set\n");
 
         /* Without a GHCB, just return right back to the guest */
         return 1;
     }
 
     if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, ghcb_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map)) {
         /* Unable to map GHCB from guest */
         vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: error mapping GHCB [%#llx] from guest\n",
                 ghcb_gpa);
 
         /* Without a GHCB, just return right back to the guest */
         return 1;
     }
 
     svm->sev_es.ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
     ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
 
     trace_kvm_vmgexit_enter(vcpu->vcpu_id, ghcb);
 
     exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
 
     ret = sev_es_validate_vmgexit(svm);
     if (ret)
         return ret;
 
     sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(svm);
     ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
     ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
 
     switch (exit_code) {
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
         ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2);
         if (ret)
             break;
 
         ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_read(vcpu,
                        control->exit_info_1,
                        control->exit_info_2,
                        svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
         break;
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
         ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, false, control->exit_info_2);
         if (ret)
             break;
 
         ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_write(vcpu,
                         control->exit_info_1,
                         control->exit_info_2,
                         svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
         break;
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
         ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
         break;
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
         ret = kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold(vcpu);
         break;
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE: {
         struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
 
         switch (control->exit_info_1) {
         case 0:
             /* Set AP jump table address */
             sev->ap_jump_table = control->exit_info_2;
             break;
         case 1:
             /* Get AP jump table address */
             ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, sev->ap_jump_table);
             break;
         default:
             pr_err("svm: vmgexit: unsupported AP jump table request - exit_info_1=%#llx\n",
                    control->exit_info_1);
             ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 2);
             ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT);
         }
 
         ret = 1;
         break;
     }
     case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
         vcpu_unimpl(vcpu,
                 "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
                 control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
         ret = -EINVAL;
         break;
     default:
         ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
     }
 
     return ret;
 }
 
 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
 {
     int count;
     int bytes;
     int r;
 
     if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 > INT_MAX)
         return -EINVAL;
 
     count = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
     if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(count, size, &bytes)))
         return -EINVAL;
 
     r = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, bytes);
     if (r)
         return r;
 
     return kvm_sev_es_string_io(&svm->vcpu, size, port, svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
                     count, in);
 }
 
 static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
 
     svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
     svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
 
     /*
      * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
      * VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
      * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.
      */
     svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
 
     /* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
     svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
     svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
     svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_READ);
     svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
     svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
     svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
 
     svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
 
     /* Track EFER/CR register changes */
     svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_EFER_WRITE);
     svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR0_WRITE);
     svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
     svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
 
     /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
     clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
 
     /* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
     svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
 
     /* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
     set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
     set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
     set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
     set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
     set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
     set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
 
     if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) &&
         (guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
          guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID))) {
         set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_TSC_AUX, 1, 1);
         if (guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
             svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
     }
 }
 
 void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
     clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
 
     if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
         sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
 }
 
 void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
     /*
      * Set the GHCB MSR value as per the GHCB specification when emulating
      * vCPU RESET for an SEV-ES guest.
      */
     set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
                         GHCB_VERSION_MIN,
                         sev_enc_bit));
 }
 
 void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
 {
     /*
      * As an SEV-ES guest, hardware will restore the host state on VMEXIT,
      * of which one step is to perform a VMLOAD.  KVM performs the
      * corresponding VMSAVE in svm_prepare_guest_switch for both
      * traditional and SEV-ES guests.
      */
 
     /* XCR0 is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
     hostsa->xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
 
     /* PKRU is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
     hostsa->pkru = read_pkru();
 
     /* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
     hostsa->xss = host_xss;
 }
 
 void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
 {
     struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 
     /* First SIPI: Use the values as initially set by the VMM */
     if (!svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi) {
         svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi = true;
         return;
     }
 
     /*
      * Subsequent SIPI: Return from an AP Reset Hold VMGEXIT, where
      * the guest will set the CS and RIP. Set SW_EXIT_INFO_2 to a
      * non-zero value.
      */
     if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
         return;
 
     ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);
 }